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INTRODUCTION
The law of defamation in the United Kingdom remains to this day
largely the product of 400 years of common law evolution. It reflects the
efforts of successive generations of jurists to balance two fundamental but
conflicting objectives: the protection of individual dignity, and the
preservation of the freedoms of speech and press. Maintaining the proper
equilibrium between these interests has always been difficult, particularly
when one generation's accommodation of them is subjected to the pressures
of the next generation's social, economic, and technological transformations.
In the United Kingdom, moreover, inflexible rules of stare decisis ' severely
* Lecturer in Business Law, University of Stirling, Scotland, and Visiting Fellow,
Stirling Media Research Institute.
** Lecturer in Business Law, Heriot-Watt University, Scotland. We are grateful to
Philip Morris, Dr. Nancy Morris and Dr. Gavin Little for their insightful comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
1. In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords performs both judicial and legislative
functions that are kept distinct by the conventions of the "unwritten" British constitution.
The Law Lords of the House of Lords sit as the final court of appeal in all matters save
Scottish criminal cases, and the ratio decidendi of their decisions not only binds all inferior
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limit common law adjustments to such pressures, particularly in areas like
defamation law, where decades-old and even centuries-old binding
precedents exist. Thus, it is not surprising that the tort of defamation has
periodically undergone legislative modifications at the margins. Indeed, over
the past two centuries, the British Parliament has enacted important reforms
of defamation law about once every half century.2 Conforming to this
pattern, the Defamation Act 1996, which became law on July 4, 1996, is the
first major piece of libel legislation since the Defamation Act 1952.
Although most of the provisions of the 1996 Act apply throughout the
United Kingdom, 3 they were drafted with an eye toward the acute problems
currently experienced in England and Wales. The relative ease with which
libel plaintiffs can establish a defendant's liability and the huge damage
awards that have become commonplace in England since the mid-1980s
have raised fears that English law goes too far in safeguarding the
reputational interests of claimants at the expense of free discussion,
discouraging legitimate investigative journalism and the open criticism of
courts, but are rarely deviated from by the Law Lords themselves in subsequent cases.
Indeed, the House of Lords considered itself bound by its previous precedents until 1966,
when it abandoned this uncompromising rule. See Note 3 All E.R. 177 (1966). To this day,
the House of Lords has rarely overruled one of its prior decisions. See E.C.S. WADE & A.W.
BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW 371 (1 lth ed. 1993). See generally
SIR RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977); A.A. PATERSON, THE LAW
LORDS (1982). A sense of the stringent institutional constraints the British system places on
judicial discretion can be gained from the following observation by Lord Hailsham:
A judge in Britain is hedged about by a far more restrictive view of precedent than
they [foreign judges], and since most decisions nowadays consist in the interpreta-
tion and application of Acts of Parliament, it is even more important that the rules
of construing Acts of Parliament followed by English and Scottish judges are far
more rigid and limiting than any country in the world not operating the British
system.. . . [O]ur traditional method of Parliamentary draughtsmanship is so much
more detailed than in any European country as to fetter judicial independence to
an extent quite unparalleled elsewhere. Even on matters where we are wont to
leave a question to a judge's discretion, his use of it is subject to the pyramidal
system of appeal.
LORD HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY: DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION 106-07
(1978).
2. Prominent libel lawyer Peter Carter-Ruck, who observed this pattern, cites Fox's
Libel Act 1792, three measures between 1840 and 1845 (the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840,
Libel Act 1843, and Libel Act 1845), the Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888, and the
Defamation Act 1952. See P.F. CARTER-RUCK, ET AL, CARTER-RUCK ON LIBEL AND
SLANDER 15 (4th ed. 1992).
3. All of the changes that the Act makes apply in England and Wales and in Northern
Ireland. The Act did not alter the limitations period for defamation claims brought in
Scotland (which remains three years), and neither the new "summary disposal of claim"
procedure, discussed below, nor a minor rule regarding applications for interlocutory orders,
see Defamation Act, 1996, § 7, were made available in Scotland. The Act has no effect in
the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, the other two legal systems of the United Kingdom.
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public policy and policy-makers. And it is not just the English press that is
affected. In the information age, publications in both written and electronic
form originating from all comers of the world, and particularly the United
States, are freely disseminated throughout the United Kingdom, and many
of those publications contain statements that could give rise to English
defamation suits.' It is easy under English law for English courts to
exercise jurisdiction over libel claims even in cases where relatively few
copies of an allegedly defamatory publication reach the United Kingdom,'
and thus publishers whose main audience live outside of the United
Kingdom could find themselves defending an English libel action. The
success or failure of defamation reform in the United Kingdom, therefore,
is an issue of importance to the media throughout the world.
The Defamation Act 1996, like its legislative forebearers, fine-tunes
rather than overhauls long-standing principles of English defamation law.
Nonetheless, the scope of the reforms it makes is fairly wide. For example,
the Act attempts to modernize certain defenses to defamation claims so that
they take account of the difficulties posed by the emergence of new
communication technologies and the growing internationalization of the
4. And in fact they often have. An American corporation sued a retired Scottish
professor for highly critical statements reported in The New York Times. See James Penzi,
Comment, Libel Actions in England, a Game of Truth or Dare? Considering Recent Upjohn
Cases and the Consequences of "Speaking Out," 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 211 (1996).
In 1990, a Swedish newspaper settled a London libel action commenced by an Indian
businessman. See Gregory T. Walters, Note, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc.:
The Clash Between Protection of Free Speech in the United States and Great Britain, 16
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 895, 919-22 (1993). London was the preferred forum of former Greek
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou when he sued the United States magazine Time for libel.
See Don J. DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad: Libel Plaintiffs Say it's Easier Suing U.S. Media
Elsewhere, 75 A.B.A. J. 38 (Sept. 1989). A scientist based in Geneva and the United States
was sued in London for statements he made on Usenet, a world-wide computer-based
communication system. See, e.g., Clare Dyer, Scientist Wins Out of Court Damages for
Internet Libel, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 5, 1995, pt. 1, at 5. The authors discuss the
impact that a proliferation of English libel suits against non-English publications could have
on the nations of the European Union in Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing
Defamation Law in the European Union, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 1997).
5. For example, a British arctic explorer was awarded £100,000 ($150,000) in a suit
against a Canadian magazine with a circulation of 400 within the United Kingdom, see
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW 44 (3d ed. 1992); a Member of
Parliament was awarded £150,000 (reduced to £50,000 on appeal) for a satirical press release
circulated to 91 people, id.; a plaintiff won £450,000 from a Greek-language newspaper with
a U.K. circulation of 50, see Costas Douzinas et al., It's All Greek to Me: Libel Law and
Freedom of the Press, 137 NEW L.J. 609 (1987); an Arabic-language magazine with a small
circulation lost a £310,000 verdict, see Koo 's £300,000- A Sign of the Times, 138 NEW
L.J. 824 (1988); and a monthly magazine with a circulation under 9,000 had a £300,000
judgment entered against it, see Tom G. Crone, A Newspaper Lawyer's View, 86 LAW Soc'Y
GAZ. 14 (Sept 6, 1989).
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media.6 It reduces the limitations period for defamation claims made within
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland to one year.' More ambitiously, the
Act introduces procedural reforms intended to simplify defamation lawsuits,
encourage early settlement of less serious claims, and curb the escalating
cost of libel litigation.' It permits Members of Parliament (MPs) to
selectively waive their Parliamentary privilege if necessary to pursue their
own defamation claims (without losing their immunity from claims brought
by others).9 With the exception of this last provision, which was added late
in the law-making process so that an individual MP could pursue a libel
claim against The Guardian newspaper, each of the changes the Act makes
was well-considered and should improve the operation of defamation law.
Nonetheless, we believe that the impact of the Act will be much less
dramatic than its sponsors no doubt hope, and that an opportunity for more
meaningful and effective reform was squandered.
Because the Act was primarily directed at problems that have arisen
in England, this article focuses on the Act's effect on the law of England
and Wales.' In the first part of the article we will canvass English
defamation law as it stood before passage of the 1996 Act, and some of the
problems that prompted legislative action. In the second part we will discuss
the Act itself with particular attention being paid to its likely impact on
libel litigation in England and Wales. In the final section of the article we
will argue that the Act ultimately failed to confront, much less remedy, the
crisis in English defamation law.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ACT
Under long-established English common law principles, a plain-
tiff-whether an individual, company, or other legal person"-can
establish a prima facie case of defamation merely by showing that the
defendant voluntarily communicated to a third party ("published") a
defamatory statement referring directly or indirectly to the plaintiff.2 A
defamatory statement is simply a statement that exposes the plaintiff to
6. Defamation Act, 1996, §§ 1, 14, 15 & sched. 1.
7. Id. §§ 5, 6.
8. Id. §§ 2-4, 8-11.
9. Id. § 13.
10. For a brief discussion of the 1996 Act's effect on the law of Scotland, see Linda
Macpherson & Douglas W. Vick, Defamation Reform in Scotland, 1997 JURID. REv. 53.
11. Cases supporting the principle that companies and other legal persons may sue in
libel in the same manner as natural persons include South Hetton Coal Co. Ltd. v. North
Eastern News Ass'n Ltd., [1894] 1 Q.B. 133, 138-39, and Bognor Regis U.D.C. v. Campion,
[1972] 2 Q.B. 169, 176-77.
12. See, e.g., Newstead v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., [1940] 1 K.B. 377, 388-89.
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hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or tends to "lower the plaintiff in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally."13 There is a
rebuttable presumption that a defamatory statement is false, relieving the
plaintiff of any obligation to introduce evidence regarding the statement's
accuracy," and the plaintiff can make out a prima facie case without
presenting evidence that the defendant intended to defame anyone15 or
acted in bad faith.16 If the statement is in writing, recorded, or otherwise
in some permanent form (a "libel"), the plaintiff is presumed to have
suffered injury from publication of the statement, and need not offer proof
of any actual harm.'
7
It is through several available defenses to a defamation claim that
English law recognizes free speech and free press interests. For example,
while a defamatory statement is presumed false, the defendant can avoid
liability by proving that the statement is substantially true (the "justifica-
tion" defense).' 8 The defense of "fair comment" protects the expression of
opinion concerning issues of public importance and criticism of the conduct
of government officials, provided the opinion is expressed without malice 9
and the defendant can prove the facts on which the opinion was based.2"
Some statements-for example, those made during Parliamentary debate, or
in a fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings within the United
Kingdom-are absolutely privileged. 2' Other statements might be covered
by a qualified privilege if by publishing them the defendant advanced some
recognized "legal, social, or moral" duty.' For example, a qualified
13. Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240 (Lord Atldn).
14. See, e.g., Belt v. Lawes, [1882] L.J.Q.B. 359, 361.
15. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, [1929] 2 K.B. 331, 354 (Russell
L.J.).
16. The plaintiff is required to plead that the statements were published "maliciously,"
but this is a formality, as malicious intent is not a necessary element for recovery. See
Bromage and Another v. Prosser, [1825] 107 Eng. Rep. 1051, 1055.
17. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, [1916] 2 A.C. 481, 500 (Lord Sumner); Rateliffe v. Evans,
[1892] 2 Q.B. 524, 528-30 (Bowen L.J.).
18. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 81 (4th ed. 1979). See also M'Pherson
v. Daniels, [1829] B. & C. 263 (Littledale, J.).
19. In this context, "malicee means indifference to the truth of what is published, a
desire to injure the plaintiff, or desire to obtain an improper personal advantage. ROBERTSON
& NICOL, supra note 5, at 71-72; Horrocks v. Lowe, [1975] A.C. 135, 149 (Lord Diplock).
20. Kemsley v. Foot, [1952] A.C. 345, 356-57 (Lord Porter); Hunt v. Star Newspaper
Co. Ltd., [1908] 2 K.B. 309, 320 (Fletcher Moulton L.J.).
21. 28 HALSBURY's LAws, supra note 18, para. 98.
22. Id. 111; ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 86-93. The defendant must also
show that the parties to whom such statements were published had a legitimate interest in
receiving them.
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privilege attaches to a fair and accurate report of a matter of public
interest. 23 Unlike an absolute privilege, the assertion of a qualified
privilege will be defeated by proof of malice.24 Less commonly invoked
defenses include innocent dissemination and unintentional defamation,
which are discussed below.
This brief summary of the various available defenses does not do
justice to the complexity of their application in concrete cases. Indeed, the
defenses, with their myriad limitations and qualifications, are typically the
primary focus of libel suits, and their convolutions are usually responsible
for the often staggering expense litigants incur in defamation cases.25
Moreover, it has become apparent in recent years that these defenses do not
always respond to the realities of modem media activities. For example, the
increasingly international character of media reports available within the
United Kingdom-fuelled both by the UK's involvement in the European
Union as well as the now commonplace availability of foreign publica-
tions-has exposed shortcomings in legal principles developed with
domestic news reporting in mind. The unique problems posed by new
computer-based technologies, like the Internet, confound efforts to allocate
responsibility for defamatory messages transmitted through them.
More fundamentally, in the past decade there has been a dramatic rise
in the amounts of damages awarded against media defendants in libel cases,
with detrimental consequences for press freedom. Defamation law has been
exempt from the general trend of removing civil actions from the province
of juries.26 Even with the changes brought by the Defamation Act 1996,
juries will continue to decide most of the substantive issues relevant to the
outcome of a libel case.27 More controversially, juries remain vested with
the power to determine the level of compensatory and exemplary damages
23. ROBERTSON & NIcoL, supra note 5, at 365-66, 393-95.
24. 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 18, para 3.
25. See, e.g., Angella Johnson & Clare Dyer, 'Scapegoat' Doctor Wins Libel Damage
of £625,000, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 24, 1996, pt. 1, at 1 (defendant liable for
plaintiff's costs of £500,000, in addition to £625,000 awarded in damages).
26. Either party to a defamation action can demand a jury trial. Supreme Court Act,
1981, § 69; Rules of Supreme Court, Order 33, rule 5. Such a request can be refused only
when a jury trial would impede the efficient administration of justice, for example where a
lengthy examination of complex documents or accounts is required. See Viscount De L'Isle
v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1987] 3 All E.R. 499; Beta Construction Ltd. and Another v.
Channel Four TV Co. Ltd., [1990] 2 All E.R. 1012.
27. A few key issues are determined by the judge rather than the jury. Prominent among
them are whether the defendant's words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, see
Keays v. Murdoch Magazines (UK) Ltd. and Another, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1184, and whether
a statement implicates the public interest, see Telnikoffv. Matusevitch [1990] 3 W.L.R. 725,
730.
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to be awarded to a successful plaintiff. Damage awards (and settlements) in
defamation cases routinely surpass £50,000 ($75,000), and a few cases have
topped £1,000,000 ($1,500,000).28 In addition, under the English rule a
defeated defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's costs and legal fees,29
which in libel cases often approach the size of the verdict itself. Despite
recent judicial efforts to rein in runaway libel verdicts, 30 the compensation
awarded for reputational harms still frequently exceeds that awarded in
cases involving serious physical injuries.3
The two most conspicuous characteristics of modem libel litiga-
tion-the expense involved in pursuing and defending a claim, and the
threat of a huge award of damages and costs-have created a system that
operates much differently for less wealthy individuals than for the rich and
the powerful. Because contingency fee arrangements are unlawful in the
United Kingdom, moderate- and low-income persons depend on the state-
funded legal aid program to obtain legal representation in civil lawsuits.32
28. For examples of six- and seven-figure damage awards made in recent years, see
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 44; Crone, supra note 5; Johnson & Dyer, supra note
25, at 3; Koo 's £300,000- A Sign of the Times, supra note 5; P.R. Ghandi, No End to Libel
Roulette, 86 LAW SOCY GAz. 19 (Dec. 6, 1989); Richard Shillito, Making Bones of Sticks
& Stones, 91 LAw Soc'Y GAz. 20, 22-23 (Oct. 19, 1994). Huge damage awards have been
handed down even against publications with a limited circulation within the United
Kingdom. See supra note 5.
29. In the United Kingdom, as in most European countries, the losing party in litigation
is required to pay the costs and attorney fees of the prevailing party as a matter of course.
See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 37 (Winter 1984).
30. In December 1995, the Court of Appeal broke from long-established custom and
permitted trial judges, if they so choose, to provide greater guidance to juries regarding
damage awards in libel cases. Judges may now suggest nonbinding upper and lower damage
figures, and inform juries (for purposes of drawing comparisons) of the awards typically
made in personal injury cases. See John v. MGN Ltd., [1996] 2 All E.R. 35. In 1990, the
Court of Appeal was given the power to substitute its own assessment of damages for that
of the jury whenever it found a libel judgment excessive. Court and Legal Services Act,
1990, § 8(1). Between 1990 and the end of 1995, the Court of Appeal substituted its own
figure for that of the jury on four occasions, reducing jury verdicts ranging from £150,000
to £350,000 to awards ranging from £50,000 to £120,000. See John, [1996] 2 All E.R 35;
Houston v. Smith [1993] C.A. Transcript 1544 (unreported case, Court of Appeal, December
14, 1993) (cited in John, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 50); Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers
(1986) Ltd., [1993] 3 W.L.R. 953; Gorman v. Mudd, [1992] CA Transcript 1076 (unreported
case, Court of Appeal, October 15, 1992) (cited in John, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 49).
31. See, e.g., James Meikle, Ex-council Chief gets Libel Payout, THE GUARDIAN
(London), June 5, 1996, part 1, at 4; Johnson and Dyer, supra note 25, at 1, 3. See generally
ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 43.
32. In the United Kingdom, it is primarily through the statutory schemes for legal aid,
see, e.g., Legal Aid Act, 1988, that those who are not wealthy obtain legal representation
in civil matters. The United Kingdom does not allow lawyers to enter into contingency fee
arrangements of the sort prevalent in the United States, where clients agree that a set
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Legal aid is unavailable in defamation cases,33 however, and the cost of
pursuing a libel claim has become prohibitive for all but the most wealthy,
or those backed by organizations with substantial resources. As a conse-
quence, the press is largely unaccountable in reporting stories involving
those individuals financially incapable of bringing a defamation action. On
the other hand, a unique combination of substantive and procedural rules
makes English defamation law singularly favorable to those plaintiffs who
have the resources necessary to pursue a libel action to its conclusion. Little
is required to establish a prima facie case of defamation while the defenses
intended to protect free expression are plagued by limitations that often
undermine their effectiveness, and those who can afford to make the
considerable investment required to pursue a libel action are often
handsomely rewarded with extravagant monetary awards at the end of the
process.
The irony is that the law deters critical reporting of precisely those
whose activities most directly affect the public interest. Those who can
afford libel litigation are also most likely to be the subject of legitimate
comment or journalistic investigation, and are in the best position to rebut
negative publicity without needing to resort to the bludgeon of English libel
law. Yet the temptation to use the threat of a libel writ to control one's
press coverage can be irresistible, and experience shows that many have
yielded to this temptation. Particularly litigious individuals, such as Robert
Maxwell, have used this threat to discourage inquiry into their activities.34
The raison d'etre for the Goldsmith Libel Fund is to finance libel suits by
plaintiffs with conservative sympathies against the "left-wing" press.35
percentage of any damage award or settlement will go the client's attorney. Thus, perhaps
the most important mechanism for providing access to justice for middle- and lower-income
individuals in the United States is unavailable in Great Britain. Parliament has authorized
"conditional fee arrangements" in certain proceedings specified by the Lord Chancellor, see
Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, § 58, and the Lord Chancellor has recently issued
orders implementing the Act. See Lord Mackay, Reducing Risks for Clients, LAW SOC'Y
GAZ. 10 (July 5, 1995). It is unlikely that this limited scheme will displace legal aid as the
primary means for access to justice in the British system.
33. Legal Aid Act, 1988, ch. 34, sched. 2, pt. II, para. 1 (Eng.).
34. For a discussion of Maxwell's coercion of the press, see Russell L. Weaver &
Geoffrey Bennett, New York Times v. Sullivan: The "Actual Malice "-Standard and
Editorial Decisionmaking, 14 J. MEDIA L. & PRAc. 2, 8 (1993). Parallels can be drawn to
recent experiences in the United States, where some less scrupulous companies have
attempted to intimidate their critics and silence their opponents by launching costly libel
lawsuits, despite the long odds of prevailing on the merits under U.S. defamation laws. See,
e.g., GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT
(1996); Lois G. FORER, A CILLING EFFECT (1987); DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER,
PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 40-41 (1992).
35. See ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 40.
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English defamation law is frequently criticized for deterring the speech that
matters most, and has drawn the censure of the European Court of Human
Rights.3
6
In the years following the enactment of the Defamation Act 1952,
various working groups proposed reforms of English libel law. Perhaps the
best known of these proposals were contained in the reports prepared by the
Joint Working Party of Justice and the British Committee of the Intemation-
al Press Institute in 19653' and the Committee on Defamation (Faulks
Committee) in 1975.38 For the most part, Parliament was unswayed by the
various demands for reform,39 until a working group led by Lord Justice
Neill recommended changes in practice and procedure in 1991.4 The
recommendations in the Neill Committee report ultimately led to the
introduction of a Defamation Reform Bill in the House of Lords in 1995.
That bill evolved into the Defamation Act 1996.
II. THE DEFAMATION ACT 1996
The provisions of the Defamation Act 1996 can be divided roughly
into three categories. In the first category are the provisions modifying
established defenses to make them more responsive to the problems posed
by new technologies and the increasingly international scope of news
reporting.4 A second category includes largely procedural reforms meant
to reduce the complexity and expense associated with trying less serious
libel cases.42 Finally, in a category by itself, is a provision allowing
Members of Parliament to waive Parliamentary privilege if necessary to
36. See, e.g., Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. U.K., App. No. 18139/91, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442
(1995) (court decision) (ruling that a £1.5 million damage award infringed defendant's rights
under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights). Under the law of the United
Kingdom, however, the precedential value of the rulings of the European Court of Human
Rights is limited. See infra note 145.
37. JOINT WORKING PARTY OF JUSTICE AND THE BRITISH COMM. OF THE INT'L PRESS
INST., THE LAW AND THE PRESS 43-44 (1965).
38. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION (1975), CMND 5909, 172-81
[hereinafter FAULKs COMMITTEE REPORT].
39. Parliament did reduce the limitations period for defamation actions from six years
to three in 1985, see Administration of Justice Act, 1985, ch. 61, § 57 (Eng.), and in 1990
empowered the Court of Appeal to substitute its independent determination of damages for
that of the jury in cases in which the verdict was deemed excessive. See Courts and Legal
Services Act, 1990, ch. 41, § 8(a) (Eng.).
40. Lord Chancellor's Department, Reforming Defamation Law and Procedure:
Consultation on Draft Bill 1.2 (July 1995) (hereinafter Consultation Report) (citing
Supreme Court Procedure Committee, Report on Practice and Procedure in Defamation
(1991)).
41. Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31, §§ 1, 7, 12, 14-15, sched. I (Eng.).
42. Id. §§ 2-6, 8-10.
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pursue a libel claim.43
A. The New Defenses4
Section 1 of the Act, designated "responsibility for publication,"
modernizes the common law defense of innocent dissemination. Generally,
each person responsible for making, repeating, or disseminating a defamato-
ry statement is liable to the victim of the libel even in the absence of proof
of fault. This rule reaches not only authors and publishers exercising
editorial control over the works they produce, but also printers, newsagents,
booksellers, and libraries which play a role in making the offending
statement available to the public. Taken to its logical extreme, this rule
would impose unreasonable burdens on parties who do not and could not
know that certain publications they helped produce or distribute contained
defamatory matter. The defense of innocent dissemination was the common
law's response to the occasional injustice strict application of this rule
produced. This defense relieved distributors (but, perversely, not printers)
of liability, if they had no control over the content of the offending
publication and neither knew nor should have known that an item they
distributed contained or was likely to contain defamatory statements.
45
The innocent dissemination defense as modified by the 1996 Act
remains unavailable to the authors, editors, and commercial publishers
primarily responsible for the content of materials they produce for public
consumption.46 However, the Act provides that the defense will now cover
43. Id. § 13.
44. In addition to reforms discussed in the text, the Act also amended an evidentiary rule
that affects the operation of the justification defense in narrow circumstances. The Civil Evi-
dence Act, 1968, ch. 64, § 13, provided that evidence of a criminal conviction was
irrebuttable proof in a subsequent defamation action that the person convicted actually com-
mitted the crime at issue. The Neill Committee concluded that this rule deterred the media
from questioning official conduct in connection with doubtful convictions. Under the old
rule, if a report challenging someone's conviction as wrongful became the subject of a
defamation suit (brought, for example, by police investigators or prosecutors), the defendant
would not be able to plead and prove justification because of the conclusive effect given
evidence of the challenged conviction. The Defamation Act 1996 amends the Civil Evidence
Act 1968 so as to limit the situations in which convictions are given conclusive effect to
cases in which the plaintiff has been convicted of an offense. Proof of the conviction of
someone other than the plaintiff will still be admissible, but will not be deemed conclusive.
See Defamation Act, 1996, § 12.
45. Emmens v. Pottle, 16 Q.B.D. 354 (Eng. C.A. 1885).
46. Defamation Act, 1996, § l(1)(a). The Act defines the "author" of a statement as the
statement's "originator," unless that person "did not intend that his statement be published
at all"; the "editor" as the "person having editorial or equivalent responsibility for the
content of the statement or the decision to publish it;" and the "publisher" as the "person
whose business is issuing material to the public, or a section of the public, who issues
material containing the statement in the course of that business." Id. § 1(2). Although the
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printers,47 and sets out a nonexhaustive list of other persons eligible to
claim the defense.48 Now, the defense may be asserted by the manufactur-
ers, distributors, and exhibitors of films and sound recordings, as well as
those who process or operate electronic communications equipment, such
as CD- ROMs.49 It is available to broadcasters of live radio or television
programs, when defamatory statements are made "in circumstances in which
[the broadcaster] has no effective control over the maker of the state-
ment."50 This scenario arose recently when a government minister sued a
London television company over an unsolicited defamatory comment made
by a member of the studio audience during a live political comment
program." In addition, the Act provides that the operators or providers of
"'access to a communications system" can assert the defense so long as they
had "no effective control" over the person transmitting a defamatory
statement over the system. 2 This would presumably protect telephone
companies, mobile phone systems, radio communication systems, and the
like. Although the Act does not expressly say so, this provision should also
cover the individuals and institutions, including universities, that operate the
computers constituting the Internet network, as well as commercial online
computer host services such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and Delphi.53
Act defines "publisher" more narrowly than that term is understood at common law (i.e., the
person who communicates the statement complained of to a party other than the plaintiff),
Parliament contemplated no change in the common law meaning of the term outside the
context of determining whether the innocent dissemination defense applies. Id. § 17. It is
interesting to note that under the Act's definition, someone who originates a message may
not be the message's "author" if that person did not intend the statement be "published"
(presumably in the common law sense of the term). This likely will have little practical
importance, since the innocent dissemination defense will be available only to those who
exercise reasonable care, see infra text accompanying notes 146-47, and it would be rare that
a statement would be unintentionally communicated to a third party under circumstances
where the originator was not negligent in allowing the statement to reach that third party.
47. Id. § 1(3)(a). The Lord Chancellor's Department, representing the views of the
Conservative Party government in power when the Defamation Bill was proposed, justified
this change by noting that modem printing processes allow work to be completed without
the printer ever seeing the work in written form. Consultation Report, supra note 40,
para. 2.2.
48. See Defamation Act, 1996, § 1(3). Because the list is not exhaustive, the courts may
extend it by analogy as new communications technologies emerge.
49. Id. § 1(3)(b), (c).
50. Id. § I(3)(d).
51. Lawrence Abramson & Denton Hall, Responsibility for Publication: Potential
Developments in the Law of Defamation, 13 INT'L MEDIA L. 61, 61 (1995).
52. Defamation Act, 1996, § l(3)(e).
53. When the Defamation Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State indicated that Internet service providers would be covered by
section 1(3)(e). H.L. Deb. vol. 570 col. 605, 8 March 1996. It is noteworthy, however, that
section 1(3)(c) was amended in the Commons so that the defense covered those who "oper-
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However, the Act does not directly address under what circumstances those
who make defamatory statements over computer-based communications
systems are beyond the "effective control" of the operators, a difficult
question since it is at least theoretically possible to screen the messages and
the users of such systems.54
Like its common law predecessor, the defense provided by section 1
is not absolute. To invoke it, the defendant must show that "he did not
know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or contributed
to the publication of a defamatory statement,"55 and that "he took reason-
able care in relation to [the statement's] publication."56 The Act offers
guidance for the determination of whether the defendant acted reasonably,
listing three factors to be considered: the degree to which the defendant was
responsible "for the content of the statement or the decision to publish it,"
the circumstances surrounding the publication, and "the previous conduct
or character of the author, editor or publisher" primarily responsible for
communicating the defamatory statement.57 This last consideration seems
to indicate that distributors of controversial publications like Private Eye,
a satirical news magazine, might not be able to sustain their burden of
showing they acted with due care without establishing some system for
screening all issues of such publications for defamatory content. Lord
Denning warned that a rule punishing those who disseminate publications
of a "bad character" was potentially repressive;58 it encourages a privatized
form of censorship, as distributors will refuse to carry those publications
most critical of public figures if they fear that they might be liable for what
those publications say. Those concerned about the implications this has for
freedom of speech within the United Kingdom will find little solace in the
at[e] or provid[e] any.., system or service by means of which the [defamatory] statement
is... made available in electronic form." The change was apparently requested by Reuters
and other press agencies, and was intended to ensure that providers of electronically recorded
information were covered by the Act. See H.C. Standing Committee A col. 4, 6 June 1996.
Arguably, this language too could apply to the Internet and other computer-based
communication systems.
54. The difficulties this issue presents are apparent in recent decisions from the United
States. See, e.g., Cubby v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton
Oakmount Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1784 (N.Y. 1995).
55. Defamation Act, 1996, § l(1)(c).
56. Id. § l(l)(b).
57. Id. § 1(5). In its original draft, the Defamation Bill stated that these factors were not
exhaustive; this language was omitted from subsequent versions of the Bill, and is not found
in the Act.
58. Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd., 2 All E.R. 566, 573 (Eng. C.A. 1977) (Lord Denning
MR, dissenting).
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case law interpreting a distributor's duty of care at common law5 9 (which
will remain persuasive authority when courts interpret section 1 of the new
Act), or in the comments made during Parliamentary debates, which were
hardly sympathetic to this criticism of the new rule."
The Act's other major substantive changes to the defamation defenses
are contained in sections 14 and 15, which expand the scope of the statutory
privileges. The relevant pre-existing law was set out in the Law of Libel
Amendment Act 1888 and the Defamation Act 1952.61 Those Acts
provided that newspapers, radio, and television broadcasters were absolutely
privileged in presenting fair, accurate, and contemporaneous reports of court
proceedings within the United Kingdom,62 and were entitled to a qualified
privilege in connection with any reports concerning matters listed in the
Schedule to the 1952 Act. 3
Section 14 of the Defamation Act 1996 confirms the absolute privilege
recognized in prior law and expands its scope in two ways. First, it does not
limit the privilege to reports appearing in newspapers, television and radio
programs. 4 Second, the absolute privilege now applies not only to reports
of proceedings in the domestic courts of the United Kingdom, but also to
proceedings in the European Court of Justice or any "attached" court,65 the
59. See, e.g., Weldon v. Times Book Co. Ltd., 28 T.L.R. 143 (Eng. C.A. 1911),
indicating that while a library was not expected to review the contents of every book it
possesses, some works may call for a more searching examination, depending on the type
of book at issue, the reputation of the author, and the standing of the publisher. Recently,
a printer, retailer, and several wholesalers of the now-defunct satirical magazine Scallywag
paid substantial sums to settle claims arising out of statements in that magazine. See
Scallywag Sequel: Printer and Seller Pay Out, MEDIA LAwYER, July 1996, at 14.
60. See, e.g., H.C. Deb. vol. 280 cols. 115-16, 119, 24 June 1996; H.C. Standing
Committee A cols. 5, 30, 6 June 1996; H.L. Deb. vol. 571 cols. 214-15, 2 April 1996.
61. See Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict. ch. 64, § 3 (Eng.);
Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 66, §§ 7-9 & sched (Eng.).
62. See Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, § 3; Defamation Act, 1952, §§ 8,9(2). See
also McCarey v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 855 (Q.B. 1964) (clarifying
that this privilege was absolute, not qualified).
63. Defamation Act, 1952, §§ 7, 9. The qualified privileges were later extended to the
cable and satellite media. See Cable and Broadcasting Act, 1984, ch. 46 § 28(3) (Eng.);
Broadcasting Act, 1990, ch. 42 § 166(3) (Eng.).
64. Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31 § 14(1) (Eng.). In addition to the new electronic and
computer-based technologies, the privilege now applies to print publications in all their
forms. The defense set out in the 1952 Act applied to "newspapers," defined as papers
"containing public news or observations thereon... which [are] printed for sale and [are]
published in the United Kingdom either periodically or... at intervals not exceeding thirty-
six days." Defamation Act, 1952, § 7(5). This limiting definition is not carried forward in
the new Act, and the privilege now applies to free newspapers, "one-off' or occasional
publications, and those magazines and journals which appear less often than every 36 days.
65. This is a reference to the European Court of First Instance, but would also include
any other court created in future treaties by the nations of the European Union.
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European Court of Human Rights, and war crimes tribunals established by
the United Nations Security Council or through international agreements.'
As under prior law, a report is entitled to the absolute privilege provided by
this section only if it is fair and accurate and made contemporaneously with
the court proceedings in issue.67
Section 15 of the 1996 Act revamps the qualified privilege provided
by the 1952 Act.68 The new Act provides that a statement is entitled to
qualified privilege if it addresses a matter of public concern published "for
the public benefit" 69 and falls within the coverage of Schedule 1 to the
new Act. Echoing established principles, the statements must be "fair and
accurate" to be privileged, and proof of malice will negate the privilege.70
Like the 1952 Act, the 1996 Act distinguishes between statements entitled
to qualified privilege "without explanation or contradiction," 71 and
statements which are privileged subject to explanation or contradiction. The
reports and statements falling within the former category are listed in Part
I of Schedule 1, reproduced in the margin.72 They include reports of the
66. Defamation Act, 1996, § 14(3).
67. Id. § 14(1). If the report is delayed because either an order of court or a statutory
provision required that the report be postponed, the report "shall be treated as published
contemporaneously if it is published as soon as practicable after publication is permitted."
Id. § 14(2).
68. The superceded provisions were contained in the Schedule to the Defamation Act
1952. Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, ch. 66, sched., pts. I & II (Eng.).
69. Defamation Act, 1996, § 15(3). The Act specifically states that the qualified
privilege provided by section 15 will not apply if the publication is prohibited by law. Id.
§ 15(4)(a).
70. Id. § 15(1).
71. Id. sched. 1, pts I & II.
72. Part I of Schedule 1 provides that the following statements are entitled to qualified
privilege without explanation or contradiction:
1. A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public of a legislature anywhere
in the world.
2. A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public before a court anywhere
in the world.
3. A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public of a person appointed to
hold a public inquiry by a government or legislature anywhere in the world.
4. A fair and accurate report of proceedings in public anywhere in the world of
an international organisation or an international conference.
5. A fair and accurate copy of or extract from any register or other document
required by law to be open to public inspection.
6. A notice or advertisement published by or on the authority of a court, or of
a judge or officer of a court, anywhere in the world.
7. A fair and accurate copy of or extract from matter published by or on the
authority of a government or legislature anywhere in the world.
8. A fair and accurate copy of or extract from matter published anywhere in the
world by an international organization or an international conference.
Id. sched. 1, pt. I.
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proceedings of international organizations, national legislatures (including
Parliament), and national courts that convene anywhere in the world.73 The
Schedule recognizes the increasingly international character of news
reporting by significantly broadening the geographical scope of the statutory
privilege, which in the 1952 Act had been limited to reports of official
proceedings within the United Kingdom, or, in some cases, the nations of
the British Commonwealth.
For statements falling within a second category of reports listed in Part
II of Schedule 1, the defendant's qualified privilege is made subject to the
additional requirement that the defendant agrees, upon the plaintiff's
request, to "publish in a suitable manner a reasonable letter or statement by
way of explanation or contradiction."74 The Act indicates that "a suitable
manner" means either in the same manner that the defamatory material was
published or "in a manner that is adequate and reasonable in the circum-
stances.""5 In essence, this gives the plaintiff a limited right of reply, and
if the defendant refuses or neglects to honor a request to respond to a
defamatory statement, the defendant forfeits the privilege. As does Part I of
the Schedule, Part II extends the geographical scope of the correlative
provisions of the Defamation Act 1952, particularly with respect to news
gathering in Europe. The qualified privilege subject to explanation or
contradiction attaches to copies of documents, notices, or the like that are
made publicly available by the various institutions of the European Union
or the national legislatures, governments, or courts of the European Union's
member states; reports of the proceedings of any public meeting held within
the member states; reports of proceedings of general meetings of UK public
companies and their equivalents in other member states; and reports of the
proceedings of local authorities, justices of the peace, and local inquiry
commissions within the United Kingdom.76 Importantly, reports of
statements issued by "any authority performing governmental functions"
within the European Union-including police functions-are covered by
778this privilege.7 The Lord Chancellor" is given the power to designate
73. This section would cover reports of proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom
in circumstances where section 14 did not apply (for example, when the report is not
contemporaneous with the proceedings). In addition, it applies to reports of proceedings or
notices issued by the International Court of Justice and other tribunals established to resolve
disputes between nations. Id. sched. 1, pt. III, para. 16(3)(d).
74. Id. §15(2)(a).
75. Id. § 15(2)(b).
76. Id. sched. 1, pt. II. This is but a sample of the reports and documents identified in
Part II of the Schedule.
77. Id. sched. 1, pt. II, para. 9. While the Defamation Bill was advancing through the
House of Lords, it was suggested that the privilege for reports issued by the police contained
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additional "bod[ies], officer[s] or other person[s]" whose reports or
statements will be covered by the privilege.79
B. The Procedural Reforms
At the heart of the 1996 Act are several provisions effecting three
procedural reforms designed to reduce the delays and expense associated
with libel litigation.80 The most straightforward of these provisions is
section 5, which reduces the limitation period in defamation cases (as well
as malicious falsehood cases) brought in England and Wales from three
years to one year.81 Because defendants bear the burden of proof on most
of the contested issues in libel actions, it is important that they receive
notice of claims against them in a timely fashion. In most civil cases, the
in paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the Defamation Act 1952 had been inadvertently dropped.
Paragraph 9 of Schedule I to the 1996 Act was thereafter amended to make clear that such
reports would continue to be privileged. H.L. Deb. vol. 571 col. 263, 2 April 1996.
78. The Lord Chancellor is a unique figure in the constitutional structure of the United
Kingdom. The individual appointed to this office exercises executive functions (as a Cabinet
member in the ruling government), presides over the House of Lords when it sits in its
legislative capacity, and is the head of the judiciary, entitled to preside over the Appellate
Committee, which performs the judicial functions of the House of Lords. See WADE &
BRADLEY, supra note 1, at 60-62.
79. Defamation Act, 1996, sched. 1, pt. II, para. 15. In Scotland, this power is vested
with the Secretary of State. It may be through this provision that the qualified privilege
"subject to explanation or contradiction" will be extended to fair and accurate reports of
those "quasi-autonomous non-governmental entities" which in recent years have been
delegated duties performed by governmental bodies in the past. Such "quangos" do not
otherwise fall within the Schedule. See Media to Blame for Flawed Libel Bill, MEDIA
LAWYER, March 1996, at 14-15.
80. A fourth measure in the 1996 Act intended to streamline defamation cases is section
7, which forbids applications for interlocutory rulings regarding "whether a statement is
arguably capable, as opposed to capable, of bearing a particular meaning or meanings
attributed to it." While the ultimate determination of the meaning of allegedly defamatory
words is left to the jury, judges can withdraw from the jury any meaning proposed by the
plaintiff which a reasonable person could not understand the words to bear. Before the new
Act, there was no interlocutory procedure for deciding whether words are "capable" of
bearing a particular meaning, but a quirk in the procedural rules did allow defendants to
move to strike a claim on the basis that it was not "arguable" that the words complained of
were capable of bearing a meaning defamatory of the plaintiff. Section 7 abolishes this
practice. At the same time, the Rules of Court have been amended to allow either party to
apply for an interlocutory order determining whether or not words complained of are capable
of bearing a particular meaning attributed to them, without needing to first raise the issue
of whether the words are "arguably" capable of bearing that meaning. Rules of Supreme
Court, Order 82, rule A.
81. Defamation Act, 1996, § 5, amending Limitation Act, 1980, §§ 4A, 28, 32A, 36(1)
(Eng.). The limitation period for defamation and malicious falsehood cases brought in
Northern Ireland was also reduced to one year; see Defamation Act, 1996, § 6, amending
Limitation Order, 1989 (N. Ir.), but the three-year limitation period in force in Scotland
remained unchanged. See Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act, 1973, § 18A (Scot.).
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party who bears the burden of proof on the chief issues (the plaintiff) is in
a position to prepare his or her case before formally commencing an action.
This is not always true in defamation cases, since defendants are often
unaware that they may have published actionable words until a libel writ
has been issued, and if too much time elapses between a media report and
the filing of a lawsuit, it may become impossible to recreate the circum-
stances and locate the sources underpinning an allegedly defamatory
statement. During debate in both Houses of Parliament, some concern was
expressed that reducing the limitation period would unfairly prejudice
plaintiffs, particularly those who need time to amass the financial resources
necessary to pursue a claim.8 2 These concerns were allayed by the
government, which noted that in practice most defamation suits are brought
within one year of the alleged libel, and in any event the new law
significantly broadens the discretionary power of judges to allow late
filings.83
A more ambitious procedural reform is undertaken by sections 2-4 of
the new Act. These provisions substantially rewrite the "offer of amends"
procedure introduced by section 4 of the Defamation Act 1952. This older
provision created a mitigating defense in cases of so-called "unintentional"
defamation, where the defendant, despite exercising reasonable care, was
unaware that a statement he or she made referred to an actual person or
could be subject to a defamatory interpretation.84 The situations where this
defense might apply do not arise often; a defamatory statement is simply
one that "lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people," and
it is rare that a speaker is unaware that this is the effect of an allegedly
defamatory remark. The defense might apply, however, when an author
innocently gives a fictional character the same name as that of a real
82. 571 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 260 (1996); 571 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 673
(1996); 278 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 133 (1996); PARL. DEB., H.L. Standing Committee
A (5th ser.) 18-19 (1996).
83. Before the 1996 amendments, a court could extend the period for filing only if the
plaintiff was unaware of the relevant facts relating to the cause of action. Under the new
law, the court can take into account all relevant factors in determining whether it would be
equitable to allow the claim to proceed in cases where the victim (or the victim's personal
representative in malicious falsehood cases that survive the death of the victim) fails to bring
suit within the one-year limitation period. Defamation Act, 1996, § 5(4), amending
Limitation Act, 1980, §§ 32A and 36(1). Situations that might justify the exercise of such
discretion could arise in cases involving police officers or doctors who need to concentrate
their resources on internal investigations before considering resort to the defamation laws,
or persons who have complained about unfair treatment or infringement of privacy to the
Broadcasting Complaints Commission, which cannot process the complaint if a court action
concerning the same subject matter is commenced. See Broadcasting Act, 1990, § 144(4)(b)
(Eng.). See generally Consultation Report, supra note 40, paras. 4.2-4.5.
84. Defamation Act, 1952, § 4(5).
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person," or when a seemingly innocuous statement turns out to be
defamatory because of circumstances unknown to the defendant.86 The
1952 Act was supposed to allow defendants to avoid heavy damages in
such circumstances by offering to remedy the harm inadvertently done (an
"offer of amends"). The defendant had to make the offer of amends
promptly upon discovering the defamatory nature of a publication, and to
serve with the offer a detailed affidavit setting out all of the facts relating
to the innocent publication of the defamatory words. The defendant was
thereafter unable to offer evidence that differed from the facts specified in
the affidavit.s7 This process could be costly, and if the offer was rejected,
the affidavit could prejudice the defendant's case at trial. As a consequence,
the procedure set out in section 4 was rarely invoked even in those cases
in which unintentional defamation did occur.8
The 1996 Act simplifies and expands the scope of the offer of amends
procedure. Now, any person who has published an allegedly defamatory
statement may make an "offer to make amends," even in cases that do not
fall within the "unintentional" defamation category defined by the old
law.89 The new provision requires that the offer be made in writing, but
dispenses with the requirement of an affidavit. 0 The offer may be
"general," in the sense that it covers all interpretations that might be given
to a statement, or it may be "qualified," referring only to a specific
defamatory meaning the offeror concedes might be conveyed by the
statement.9 The offer must include a proposal for making and publicizing
a suitable correction and apology, as well as a proposal for compensating
the aggrieved party for any damage caused by the statement.92
At first glance, an "offer to make amends" may resemble an ordinary
settlement offer, but it has legal consequences that differ substantially from
those of an offer governed by familiar contract principles.93 An offer of
amends can be "accepted" even if the offeree does not agree that any of the
specific steps proposed by the offeror are sufficient. By accepting an offer
85. See, e.g., E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones [1910] App. Cas. 20 (P.C. 1909) (appeal taken
from Eng.).
86. See, e.g., Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 39 Fr. 432 (Sess. Cas. 1902) (newspaper
printed a birth announcement without knowing that pursuer had been married only a month).
87. Defamation Act, 1952, § 4(1)(b), (2); see also Ross v. Hopkinson, 1956 C.L.Y.B.
5011 (offer made seven weeks after discovery of defamation deemed untimely).
88. See generally ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 94-95.
89. Defamation Act, 1996, § 2(1).
90. The requirements of the writing are set out in section 2(3), id.
91. Id. § 2(2).
92. Id. § 2(4).
93. However, an offer of amends can be withdrawn before acceptance, just like an
ordinary contract offer. See id. § 2(6).
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of amends, the offeree is really only agreeing that the dispute-resolution
machinery established by section 3 of the new Act will govern the case.94
The offeree surrenders any right to "bring or continue defamation
proceedings in respect of the publication concerned" against the offeror,95
as well as the right to have a jury decide the claim.96 In return, however,
the offeree will obtain the benefits of a streamlined procedure that should
resolve the claim rapidly and inexpensively, at least in comparison to the
traditional litigation route.
If the offer of amends is accepted and the parties agree on the specific
steps to be taken by the offeror, that is effectively the end of the matter. If
the offeror fails to fulfil the terms of the offer, the aggrieved party simply
applies for a court order requiring the offeror to take the specific steps that
were agreed.97 If the parties do not agree on the compensation or costs to
be paid by the offeror, the matter is referred to the court, which resolves the
issue by reference to the same principles that govern the determination of
damages and costs in defamation cases, with the important caveat that the
court, and not a jury, will make this determination.9" But if the parties
cannot agree on how a correction and apology should be made, the offeror
has final say over what steps should be taken, and the court cannot override
this determination.9 9 In earlier drafts, the Defamation Bill allowed judges
to resolve disputes between the parties over the terms of the offer by
dictating the content and form of a correction and apology, including the
prominence the correction would be given in a subsequent publication or
broadcast.'00 The media strenuously objected to this, fearing judicial
interference with their editorial independence. The government feared that
94. Id. § 3.
95. Id. § 3(2). Acceptance of an offer of amends from one person does not affect any
claims that can be made against others legally responsible for the same publication. Id.
§ 3(7). Any amount paid under an offer of amends is treated like a bona fide compromise
of the claim for purposes of discharging the offeror and calculating any diminution of the
plaintiffs recovery against other defendants under the relevant sections of the Civil Liability
(Contribution) Act, 1978 (in England and Wales and Northern Ireland) or the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 1940 (in Scotland). Id. § 3(8), (9).
96. Defamation Act, 1996, § 3(10).
97. Id. § 3(3).
98. Id. § 3(5), (6).
99. Id. § 3(4). This provision expressly allows the offeror to "make the correction and
apology by a statement in open court in terms approved by the court" and "give an
undertaking to the court as to the manner of their publication." Id. Since the Act
contemplates that an offer of amends can be made and accepted before a defamation action
has been commenced, amendments to the rules of court will be required in order to allow
this undertaking to be made.
100. The High Court, the primary trial court in England and Wales, was given similar
powers by section 4(4)(a) of the 1952 Act.
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if the offending provisions were not removed, the media would not invoke
the new procedure, rendering it as useless as section 4 of the 1952 Act had
been.'' Thus, under the terms of the Act as passed, the courts cannot
interfere with the manner in which a correction and apology is made. The
reasonableness of the offeror's actions, however, will be taken into account
by the court in making a compensation award.
0 2
If the offeree declines the offer of amends, the case goes forward as
any other libel lawsuit. The fact that the offer was made is a complete
defense to liability only if the defendant either did not know and had no
reason to believe that the offending statement was defamatory, or did not
know and had no reason to believe that it "referred to the aggrieved party
or was likely to be understood as referring to him. ' ' In essence, this is
the old unintentional defamation defense, but with one important difference.
Following the advice of the Neill Committee, the burden of proof on the
issue of the defendant's knowledge in cases where this defense is pleaded
will be placed on the plaintiff, not the defendant."° Given the broad
common law definition of defamation, it should be easy for plaintiffs to
discharge this burden in cases where the defense does not apply, but in
those rarer situations where unintentional defamation has actually occurred,
it should be easier for defendants to escape liability if they make an offer
of amends. In cases other than those of unintentional defamation, the fact
that the defendant made an offer of amends can be pleaded in mitigation of
damages. 0 5 This may be useful for those defendants who acted negligent-
ly but in good faith in making a defamatory statement.
While the new offer of amends procedure is a marked improvement
over section 4 of the 1952 Act, several shortcomings may diminish its
effectiveness. For example, an offer must be made before a defense has
been served in defamation proceedings brought against the offeror 6 The
Parliamentary Secretary to the Lord Chancellor's Department argued that
the machinery created by sections 2-4 of the new Act is "designed to
101. E.g., 572 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 20 (1996).
102. Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31, § 3(5) (Eng.).
103. Id. § 4(2) and (3). If the defendant made a qualified offer, the defense only applies
with respect to "the meaning to which the offer related." Id. § 4(2).
104. Id. § 4(3). This subsection creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's
defamatory statement was unintentional.
105. Id. § 4(5). The offer may mitigate damages regardless of whether the defendant
decides to plead it as a defense. Since relying on the offer as a defense is tantamount to
forfeiting all other defenses, see infra note 108 and accompanying text, one suspects that
most defendants will prefer the mitigation route to relying on the defense provided by
section 4(2).
106. Id. § 2(5).
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provide immediate amends, avoiding all the trouble and expense of
conventional proceedings" by encouraging a potential defendant to "come[]
forward at once," and that allowing a defendant to invoke the procedure
after serving defenses would render the process "cluttered and con-
fused."'0 7 The problem is that defendants may be unwilling to submit to
the procedure (which entails a tacit admission of wrong-doing) on such
short notice. A second problem is that the Act does not impose an upper
limit on the damages that may be awarded after an offer is made. As a
consequence, defendants conceding liability are not insulated from the threat
of substantial damages, awarded either by a judge (if the offer is accepted)
or a jury (if it is not), and this may dampen their enthusiasm for the
procedure. Moreover, there is little strategic advantage in making an offer
in cases where the plaintiff is unlikely to accept. Although the defendant
can rely on the offer as a defense in unintentional defamation cases, this is
risky, because the Act provides that an offeror asserting the offer as a
defense "may not rely on any other defence."'08 Opting instead to rely on
the offer as mitigation is little different than the existing rule that allows
defendants to mitigate their damages by issuing a prompt apology, a
practice that seemingly has done little to stem the tide of ever-climbing
damage awards against media defendants in the past decade. It remains to
be seen whether these strategic pitfalls will discourage defendants from
using the procedure, particularly in high profile cases in which plaintiffs are
most likely to insist on jury trials.
Whether to invoke the offer of amends procedure is strictly in the
hands of the parties: the defendant decides whether to make an offer, and
the plaintiff decides whether to accept it. With regard to the 1996 Act's
third important procedural reform, the parties do not have this exclusive
power. The "summary disposal of claim" procedure introduced by sections
8-10 of the Act contemplates early judicial evaluation of defamation
claims-whether requested by the parties or not-and a judicial determina-
tion of the most straightforward claims without a jury.' °
The new Act envisions the adoption of rules of court which will,
among other things, authorize either party to a defamation action to seek
summary disposal at any point in the litigation, and permit the court to
invoke the summary procedure on its own accord."0 If the court deter-
107. PARL. DEB. H.C. STANDING COMMITTEE A, First Sitting, Pan. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)
9 (1996).
108. Defamation Act, 1996, § 4(4). In cases of qualified offers, this limitation only
applies "in respect of the meaning to which the offer related." Id.
109. Id. § 8.
110. Id. § 10(1) and (2).
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mines that the plaintiffs claim is meritless, it may summarily dismiss the
case."' On the other hand, if the court determines that the defendant has
"no defence... which has a realistic prospect of success, and that there is
no other reason why the claim should be tried," it may enter judgment for
the plaintiff and grant summary relief in accordance with section 9 of the
Act.1 2 Section 9 gives the court the discretionary power to declare that
the plaintiff was libeled and to restrain the defendant from any further
dissemination of the defamatory statement;" 3 to award damages not
exceeding £10,000;" and to order the defendant to publish "a suitable
correction and apology.""15 Controversially, in cases in which the parties
cannot agree on the content of the correction and apology or the manner in
which it is to be published, the court is empowered to direct the defendant
to publish a summary of the court's judgment in the manner and at the time
the court determines."' Although the media successfully opposed a
similar provision in the offer of amends procedure on the ground it
authorized judicial interference with editorial decisionmaking, the same
objection went unheeded with respect to the summary procedure." 7
Notwithstanding this potential for infringement on editorial autonomy,
at first blush the summary procedure may seem particularly attractive to
media defendants. The £10,000 cap on damages is so far below the amounts
commonly awarded by juries or paid out in settlements that the media might
be tempted to abandon their defenses simply to take advantage of the
procedure. This would be unwise. Lord Hoffinan, who proposed the
procedure, noted that it was devised for cases in which plaintiffs sought a
quick public vindication of their reputations rather than substantial monetary
111. Id. § 8(2).
112. Id. § 8(3). This determination will not necessarily be made on the basis of pleadings
or the representations of counsel alone. The Act contemplates that procedural rules will be
drafted allowing the court to conduct a hearing at which it will consider affidavits, witness
statements, or (at the court's discretion) oral testimony and other evidence. See id. § 10(2)
(c)-(f). In determining whether to summarily dispose of a claim, the court is instructed to
consider the "extent to which there is a conflict of evidence," id. § 8(4)(c), which implies
that some cases may be disposed of without a jury trial even if certain substantive points are
contested.
113. Id. § 9(1)(a) and (d).
114. Id. § 9(l)(c). In the future, this ceiling can be raised by the Lord Chancellor through
a statutory instrument (regulation), which will be effective unless annulled by either House
of Parliament in a subsequent resolution. Id. § 9(l)(c) & (3).
115. Id. § 9(l)(b).
116. Id. § 9(2).
117. See, e.g., 278 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 145 (1996); A PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th Ser.)
35-40 (1996). The different outcome may be due to the fact that the offer of amends
procedure will only work if the media are willing to invoke it, while the operation of the
summary procedure does not depend on the media's cooperation.
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compensation, or in which defendants were threatened with litigation by
"gold diggers" over trivial defamatory remarks. Lord Hoffman stressed that
his proposal was intended to be a modest measure that would not affect
most of the high profile cases of recent years.1 8 Thus, the Act provides
that in determining whether to dispose of a claim without a jury trial, the
court is to take account of the seriousness of the plaintiff's claim and
"whether it is justifiable in the circumstances" to deny the plaintiff a full
trial, even in cases in which the defendant waives all defenses." 9 More-
over, the court is specifically instructed to consider whether the maximum
award available under the procedure is adequate to compensate the
plaintiff.12 Unless there is a major departure from what has come to be
regarded in England as an acceptable level of damages even in routine libel
caseg against the mass media, this procedure will remove few if any
important libel cases from juries.
Indeed, many opposed the procedure as unnecessary, and Lord Justice
Neill's working group had rejected it when it was first proposed. While the
new procedure is intended to encourage quicker settlements, the Neill
Committee was unconvinced that there were many trivial cases of the sort
at which the procedure is directed that would not be settled promptly by the
parties without judicial intervention.' The media are anxious to settle
cases quickly when they have no viable defenses, since to act otherwise
would only exacerbate the bill for costs. Another weakness of the proce-
dure--really a weakness of libel law generally-is the unavailability of
legal aid. While the summary procedure provides a cheaper means of
resolving a dispute, someone contemplating legal action cannot be certain
that the procedure will be used once suit is brought. If the defendant can
establish that there is a genuine defense to the claim, the action will proceed
through the usual expensive and lengthy litigation process. This prospect
will continue to discourage lower- and middle-income individuals from
seeking redress for reputational harms.
C. Waiving Parliamentary Privilege
Unlike most of their constituents, Members of Parliament need little
118. E.g., 570 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 599 (1996).
119. Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31 § 8(4)(d), (e) (Eng.). The court is also directed to
consider whether all potential defendants have been joined in the action and whether
summary disposal would be inappropriate for other defendants in the action. Id. § 8(4)(a)
and (b).
120. Id. § 8(3). The court need not take this into account if the plaintiff affirmatively
requests summary relief.
121. E.g., 570 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 599 (1996).
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encouragement or assistance to exploit the defamation laws when criticized
too vociferously in the press. Yet they themselves, if so inclined, are free
to attack others without fear of a libel writ, as statements made by members
of either the House of Commons or the House of Lords in the course of
Parliamentary proceedings are absolutely privileged. The fountainhead of
this privilege is Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688, which provides that
"[f]reedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not
to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."'"
This privilege was of central importance in the historical struggle between
the Commons and the Crown for supremacy, and to this day the liberty of
MPs to speak freely without fear of persecution in conducting their public
duties is critical to the process of democratic self-government. Parliamentary
privilege covers debates on the floor in either House, anything said in the
transaction of Parliamentary business, statements made in committee (by
MPs or witnesses giving evidence), and statements made in preparing any
document connected with the transaction of Parliamentary business or
drafted in response to an order emanating from Parliament.
2 1
Recently, MPs discovered that the privilege does not always operate
to their advantage. It is well established that the courts regard the privilege
as an absolute bar to any judicial inquiry into the workings of Parliament,
even in cases primarily concerned with statements made outside of
Parliament. 24 When Member of Parliament Neil Hamilton sued The
Guardian newspaper over allegations of improper behavior in Parlia-
ment,12 5 the court stayed the action on the ground that because it was
unable to admit evidence of Parliamentary proceedings pivotal to The
Guardian's justification defense, the defendant would be unduly prejudiced
by allowing the matter to proceed to trial. 26 Parliament was outraged by
this perceived inequity; Lord Hoffman commented that "it is unjust that
[Mr. Hamilton] should not be able to put the matter before a judge and jury,
like any other citizen who considers that his integrity has been publicly
122. Church of Scientology of California v. Johnson-Smith, 1 App Cas. 522 (A.B. 1972).
The Scottish Claim of Right 1689, contains a similar provision.
123. See WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 1, at 226-31, 242.
124. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of California v. Johnson-Smith, I App. Cas. 522
(Q.B. 1972) (court cannot inquire into what defendant MP said in Parliament in order to
prove MP's out-of-Parliament statements were malicious).
125. The newspaper alleged that Hamilton had failed to disclose that he had accepted
cash in exchange for asking questions on the Commons floor. It is through such questions
that Members of Parliament can raise issues and indirectly propose government action on
issues of interest to them or their constituents.
126. Change Will Allow MP to Try to Clear Name, MEDIA LAWYER, July 1996, at 25-26.
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defamed"127 (except those citizens, of course, who are defamed in
Parliament and prevented from suing by the Parliamentary privilege). In
response, what became Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 was
introduced at the Committee stage in the House of Lords and adopted at the
third reading in the Lords.
Section 13 allows a Member of Parliament to waive Parliamentary
privilege "so far as [it] concerns him" if necessary to pursue a civil
claim.'28 This waiver would allow evidence to be introduced in a civil
trial concerning the Member's conduct within Parliament, even if such
evidence would otherwise be forbidden by the privilege. 29 Section 13
provides that one Member's waiver does not affect the "operation" of the
privilege "in relation to a person who has not waived it,' 13° a limitation
which certainly has the potential for creating interesting conflicts when two
or more Members are involved in privileged conduct and only one of them
wishes to waive the privilege.' 3' Section 13 also makes clear that a
Member's waiver will not affect that Member's immunity from "legal
liability for words spoken or things done" conferred by the privilege that is
"waived."' 32 In other words, the waiver contemplated by section 13 is a
selective one. An MP may waive the privilege if necessary to pursue his or
her own claim, but the evidence used in this context cannot be used against
the MP by a claimant in the same or a separate action if it would render the
MP liable to that claimant. It is perhaps the paradigmatic case of having
one's cake and eating it.
Of all the changes made in the law by the Defamation Act, this late
amendment drew the most comment both within Parliament and in the
press. 3 Many were concerned that insufficient consideration was being
given to the potential constitutional implications of the measure. But
however interesting section 13 may be to scholars of the British Constitu-
tion, it is unlikely to have much impact on defamation law. On the third
127. E.g., 572 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 26 (1996).
128. Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31 § 13(1) (Eng.).
129. See id. § 13(2).
130. Id. § 13(3).
131. Indeed, this problem was presented in Hamilton's case. In addition to Hamilton, The
Guardian's allegations implicated other Members of Parliament who did not wish to waive
their privilege and contest those allegations in court.
132. Defamation Act, 1996, § 13(4).
133. This media attention intensified after the passage of the 1996 Act, when Hamilton's
libel action collapsed on the eve of trial. The Guardian claimed that the case was dropped
because Hamilton realized that the paper was prepared to prove the truth of its allegations,
trumpeting its victory with a banner headline that has already entered British journalistic
lore. See David Hencke et al., A Liar and A Cheat, THE GUARDIAN (London), October 1,
1996, pt. 1, 1.
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reading in the Lords, Lord Hoffman pointed out that before the Hamilton
case, there had been no cases in the 300 years since the English Bill of
Rights was proclaimed in which an MP had attempted to bring a libel
action which raised a question about his own Parliamentary conduct.1
34
It may be that Hamilton's case is sui generis, and that section 13 is no more
than the British equivalent of pork barrel legislation intended to benefit a
single individual, rather than a reform of more general importance.'35
III. AN OPPORTUNITY LOST
With the exception of section 13, the Defamation Act 1996 offers
well-considered reforms of defamation law. Nonetheless, those reforms fall
far short of resolving the most compelling problems in English defamation
law. For middle- and lower-income individuals harmed by irresponsible
conduct by the press, the libel laws will continue to seem to be a privilege
reserved for the rich. Legal aid remains unavailable to potential plaintiffs
(and defendants) in libel actions, and the procedural reforms conceived by
the Act do not go far enough in providing less expensive alternatives to
litigation for potential complainants. The offer of amends procedure
established by sections 2-4 of the Act comes into play only if the defendant
decides to make an offer, something a party contemplating legal action
cannot depend upon in weighing the costs and benefits of bringing suit.
Similarly, the summary disposal of claim procedure established by sections
8-11 affords few guarantees for a potential claimant concerned about the
costs of litigation, since a demonstration that there are genuine defenses will
defeat an application seeking summary relief. In short, the Act does not
remedy the fundamental problem of access to justice for all but the
wealthiest members of society.
134. 572 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 25 (1996). This situation did arise, however, in a
case originating in New Zealand and ultimately decided by the Privy Council. Prebble v.
Television New Zealand Ltd., 3 All E.R. 407 (D.C. 1994). This case was the authority relied
upon by the judge who ordered the stay in the Hamilton case.
135. This suggestion was denied by the amendment's supporters in Parliament. But it is
noteworthy that section 13 is the only important provision of the 1996 Act that had an
immediate impact on pending litigation. Sections 2-4 and 8-11, which introduce procedural
reforms, section 7, which makes a minor procedural change, and sections 14-15, which
overhaul the statutory privileges, were to be phased in on a date or dates to be determined
by the Lord Chancellor (or in Scotland, by the Secretary of State). See Defamation Act,
1996, ch. 31, § 17 (Eng.). The remaining provisions (including section 13) came into force
two months after the Act's passage, or on September 4, 1996. However, the Act expressly
states that section 1 (responsibility for publication) and sections 5-6 (reducing the limitation
period) do not apply to causes of action arising before that date. See id. §§ 1(6), 5(6), and
6(5). No such limitation was placed on section 12 (a minor evidential rule) or section 13,
which apply to cases commenced before the Act's passage.
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Moreover, the Act does not address the deleterious effect England's
defamation laws have on the exercise of the freedoms of speech and press
in the context where those freedoms matter most: when the conduct or
character of public figures is at issue. Those individuals and organizations
that have the resources and the inclination to pursue defamation claims with
vigor are often those whose activities should be subject to the greatest
public scrutiny. The defamation laws can deter the press from publishing
truthful stories concerning such individuals and organizations, even when
the stories concern "matters which it is very desirable to make public."'36
This is primarily the consequence of three characteristics of English law: the
practical effects of the allocation of evidential burdens in defamation cases;
the related problem that English law does not recognize a public figure
defense; and the decisive role given to juries in defamation cases, which is
the primary reason that exorbitant damage awards have become a common-
place feature of English libel litigation.
The allocation of burdens in defamation cases favors the plaintiff on
virtually every issue of importance. This is an accident of history. Unlike
most claims for civil wrongs, libel developed not as an action on the case
(which required proof of damage) but instead was derived from the criminal
law. '3 The purpose of criminal libel laws was the deterrence of speech
that threatened to cause a breach of the peace; whether the content of the
speech was true or of vital importance to the citizenry was irrelevant to the
law's central concern for maintaining order. The elements of English
defamation law that accommodate society's interest in preserving free
speech-the rules protecting truthful reports, the expression of critical
opinion, and fair and accurate reporting of official statements, for exam-
ple-were an historical afterthought, annexed to existing legal principles as
defenses to liability.
Though the structure of a defamation trial may be the result of
historical fortune, it has profound effects on the outcome of contemporary
defamation actions. To benefit from the justification and fair comment
defenses, for example, a media defendant cannot simply rely on the
knowledge that what was said was true, but rather must prove the truth of
its statements with evidence that will satisfy a court of law. Thus, in any
story involving someone with the means to sue, the media cannot rely on
hearsay information, no matter how reliable, unless they are certain that the
evidence would be admissible at trial. The press must give pause before
136. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 548 (Lord
Keith of Kinkel).
137. For a brief overview of the historical evolution of libel law, see CARTER-RUCK ET
AL., supra note 2, at 17-32.
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publishing any story based on the statements of witnesses who may be
unwilling to repeat those statements in court, or based on information
gleaned from confidential sources who may be unwilling to come forward
and testify in the event the story becomes the subject of a lawsuit.'38 And
the more politically sensitive a story, the more unlikely it will be that
sources will be amenable to testifying on a media defendant's behalf.
Moreover, by placing all important evidential burdens on the defendant,
English law gives the media little breathing room for error, even error made
in good faith and after reasonable investigation. 3 9 English law "assumes
that there is congruence between the legal rule and its practical effect,""''
ignoring the imprecision of the legal process in making determinations of
"truth," and the behavioral repercussions of that imprecision, namely that
the press will refrain from reporting much of what it knows is true because
of the vagaries of the legal process. 4'
Other jurisdictions have recognized the chilling effect the burden of
proving truth can have on the sort of legitimate investigative journalism
upon which a democracy depends. In the United States, for instance, a
plaintiff who sues a media defendant in libel bears the burden of proving
the falsity of a statement concerning a matter of public interest.'42 In
Germany, the Constitutional Court has held that the Basic Law (the German
Constitution) precludes the imposition of liability on the press for the non-
negligent publication of erroneous factual allegations, at least where the
allegations concern an issue of great societal importance. 143 In the
Netherlands, the fact that an allegation is untrue, or cannot be proven in a
court of law, will not render the defendant criminally or civilly responsible
unless the investigatory efforts undertaken by the defendant were not
commensurate with the gravity of the allegation.'" The European Court
of Human Rights has indicated that in cases involving public figures, legal
rules requiring the defendant to prove truth in defamation cases violate the
138. See ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 41; Weaver & Bennett, supra note 34,
at 7-8. As Lord Keith of Kinkel observed, "[Q]uite often the facts which would justify a
defamatory publication are known to be true, but admissible evidence capable of proving
those facts is not available." Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 1993
A.C. 534, 548.
139. See 28 HALSBURY'S LAWS, supra note 18, para. 131.
140. Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative
Analysis, 1 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 3, 10 (1980).
141. Id. at 10-11.
142. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
143. EIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 186 (1985) (citing 54 BVerfGE 208, 220
(1980); and 61 BVerfGE 1, 8-9 (1982)).
144. Egbert Dommering, Unlawful Publications under Dutch and European Law--Defa-
mation, Libel and Advertising, 13 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 262, 264 (1992).
[Vol. 49
Number 3] UK 'S FAILED REFORM OF DEFAMATION LAW 649
freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 45
The British Parliament, however, has determinedly resisted proposals
to shift the burden of proof on the issue of truth in defamation cases. When
the Defamation Bill was in Committee in the House of Lords, Lord Lester
proposed an amendment that would have reversed the burden of proof in
defamation actions. Finding no support, the amendment was withdrawn.'46
Even with respect to the relatively minor defense of innocent dissemination,
the government rejected the suggestion that the plaintiff should have the
burden of proving that the defendant acted unreasonably in distributing a
defamatory publication, on the ground that only the defendant would
possess the detailed knowledge of the practices and procedures relevant to
the issue." Yet the same can be said of any personal injury case in
which the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent. It is not
clear why a libel plaintiff deserves special dispensation on this score.
A related shortcoming of English libel law is the absence of some
form of public figure defense. Other legal systems, recognizing that
democratic self-government depends on the unfettered flow of information
and ideas concerning issues of public concern, provide heightened
protection for political speech, including speech relating to a public
145. Article 10 provides that freedom of expression is to be guaranteed, subject to legal
prescriptions "necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others . . . ." Nov. 4,
1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. In Lingens v. Austria, 8 E.H.R.R. 407 (1986), the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) held that article 10 is violated if the defendant is required
to prove an allegedly defamatory opinion concerning a public figure. The ECHR seemingly
takes a broader view of what is protected "opinion" than do the English courts; in
Oberschlick v. Austria, the ECHR treated as "opinion" a statement that a public figure's
views "corresponded to the philosophy and aims" of the National Socialist Party. 19
E.H.R.R. 389, 433 (1995). Nonetheless, while the United Kingdom is a signatory to the
European Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR's decisions interpreting the Convention,
while binding in individual cases, are not considered part of the United Kingdom's domestic
law, and are not binding precedent in subsequent cases before UK courts. See generally
Brind v. Secretary of State, [1991] 1 A.C. 696 (H.L.).
146. 571 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 239-43 (1996). Oddly, the argument offered against
the amendment was that a plaintiff in a libel action was often a private person with limited
resources, while the defendant was usually a wealthy corporation, and that the defendant
could better afford to develop proof regarding the accuracy of a statement. This ignores the
reality that modem defamation litigation is an option only available to the wealthy (or those
backed by wealthy organizations, such as political parties or organizations, professional
associations, or trade unions). Persons with limited resources are not likely to commence a
libel action regardless of which party has the burden of proving the truth or falsity of a
statement.
147. See Consultation Report, supra note 40, at para. 2.5 ("only the defendant knows
exactly what care he has taken").
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official's conduct, policies, or fitness for office. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that a public
figure could not prevail in a defamation action unless he or she could
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published a
defamatory statement knowing that the statement was false, or with a
reckless disregard as to whether the statement was true.148 In part, the
United States courts reason that public figures assume the risk of more
intense criticism by voluntarily entering the public sphere, and have
adequate access to the media so that they can effectively rebut attacks on
their character. 49 Suggestions that a similar rule should be adopted in
England have not been well received in Parliament. The Neill Committee
doubted that the press would treat such a defense "responsibly." ' During
Parliamentary debates over the Defamation Bill, Lord Lester was the only
peer who spoke in favour of a public figure defense. 5' Indeed, in
adopting section 13 of the 1996 Act, Parliament betrayed a bias toward
expanding, not contracting, the right of the powerful to sue over allegations
made in the press, turning New York Times Co. v. Sullivan on its head.
Opposition to the public figure defense may be influenced by fears
that the British press, already seen as irresponsible by most Members of
Parliament, would move further toward the perceived excesses of American
journalists. But other jurisdictions, including some that share England's
common law tradition, have adopted an intermediate course. In Australia,
for example, the courts have recognized a qualified privilege for defendants
who defame public figures in the course of "political discussion" if they
show that they were unaware that their defamatory statements were false,
they did not publish with reckless disregard for the truth, and they acted
reasonably in the circumstances. 52 In India, a public official can obtain
an injunction against the circulation of a defamatory publication unless the
defendant can prove the truth of the statement, but the official cannot obtain
148. 376 U.S. 254, 279-81 (1964) (interpreting the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution).
149. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
150. 570 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th Ser.) 600 (1996) (quoting Supreme Court Procedure
Committee, Report on Practice and Procedure in Defamation 164 (1991)). The Neill
Committee was of the opinion that giving the press a Sullivan defense "would mean, in
effect, that newspapers could publish more or less what they liked, provided they were
honest, if their subject happened to be within the definition of a 'public figure.' We think
this would lead to great injustice." Id.
151. Id. at 583.
152. Theophanous v. The Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. 104 (1994) (Aus.
H.C.) (interpreting the right to freedom of communication implied in the Australian
Constitution).
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damages for a defamatory statement regarding acts and conduct associated
with the official's public duties unless the official proves that the statement
was false and that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the
truth. 5 3 In Germany, courts give greater latitude to "sharp and exaggerat-
ed expressions" concerning "an important issue for society," '154 and expect
participants in political debate to relinquish some of the protections they
would otherwise be entitled to under the defamation laws. 5 Similarly,
public figures in the Netherlands are expected to tolerate greater criticism
than ordinary citizens."' Notwithstanding these precedents, the Defama-
tion Act 1996 does nothing to remedy the intimidating effect that English
law can have on political reporting.
The other characteristic of English law that over-deters free speech is
the unconscionable level of damages awarded by juries in defamation cases.
In part, escalating damage awards are a consequence of popular animosity
toward the press, fuelled by the excesses of the British tabloid newspapers.
But perhaps more problematical is the intangible nature of reputational
harm, "a concept that has no equivalent in money or money's worth." '157
The pecuniary damages often attributed to libels, such as a business's loss
of customers or goodwill, can be calculated with a reasonable degree of
certainty using well-recognized criteria. But most plaintiffs in defamation
cases are seeking a damage award that not only compensates for non-
pecuniary harms-the shame and mental suffering experienced by the
plaintiff-but also communicates a public vindication of the plaintiff's
dignity.158 Moreover, juries are allowed to assess aggravated damages
when they find the defendant's conduct particularly vexatious, 59 and
exemplary damages when they find the defendant has acted deliberately or
recklessly with the object of profiting from the defamatory statements. 60
Here, too, juries are asked to equate a vague conception of the defendant's
153. Rajgopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, 6 S.C.C. 632 (1994) (interpreting article 19 of the
Indian Constitution, protecting "freedom of speech and expression").
154. Gregory J. Thwaite &Wolfgang Brehm, German Privacy and Defamation Law: The
Right to Publish in the Shadow of the Right to Human Dignity, 8 EUIR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
336, 345 (1994).
155. BARENDT, supra note 143, at 186 (citing 61 BVerfGE 1, 13 (1982)).
156. Dommering, supra note 144, at 263-64.
157. ROBERTSON & NICOL, supra note 5, at 96.
158. See Cassell & Co. v. Broome, 1972 A.C. 1027, 1071 (quoting Uren v. John Fairfax
& Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 115, 150 (1966) (Aus. H.C.)) ("compensation by damages
operates in two ways-as a vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as consulation to him
for a wrong done").
159. See John v. MGN Ltd. [1996] 2 All E.R. 35, 48.
160. Broome v. Cassell & Co., 1972 A.C. at 1078-79 (Lord Hailsham); Riches v. News
Group Newspapers Ltd., 2 All E.R. 845, 850 (1985).
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just desserts with a concrete monetary figure. It is hardly surprising that
verdicts have been inconsistent and often excessive.
Over the decades, numerous reforms have been proposed with the
hope of bringing jury verdicts into line. For instance, in 1975 the Faulks
Committee recommended that juries should not assess damages directly, but
rather only determine what "category" of damages should be awarded
(substantial, moderate, nominal, or contemptuous), with the final determina-
tion of the actual amount to be awarded being left to judges.' The
Committee also proposed that exemplary damages in defamation cases
should be eliminated. 62 A decade earlier, it had been suggested that the
judge should lay down minimum and maximum levels for an award, with
the jury being free to assess damages within those limits. 63 While the
Defamation Bill was being debated in the House of Lords, Lords Lester and
Hoffman spoke in favour of the Faulks Committee's recommendations, and
Lord Grantley suggested that jury trials in defamation cases be abolished
altogether, except in exceptional cases. 6' But in the end, despite the
introduction of the new offer of amends and summary disposal of claim
procedures for minor claims, the Defamation Act 1996 will do nothing to
dispel the threat of excessive damage awards that hangs over most English
libel actions.
CONCLUSION
Certainly much that is disturbing about the British tabloid press is the
consequence of the economic environment in which modem media
companies operate. Driven by the desire for greater circulation figures, the
temptation to sensationalize and trivialize can seem overwhelming.
Nonetheless, we should not overlook the influence of legal doctrine, and
especially the law of defamation, on the editorial choices made by the
English press. The media naturally adapt their practices in order to
minimize their liability exposure within the parameters defined by English
libel law. For example, the preoccupation of the tabloid press with the
personal lives of the Royal Failily cannot be entirely separated from the
knowledge that as a matter of policy the Royal Family never institutes
defamation suits. 6 ' Coverage of stories involving the working class or the
161. FAULKS COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 38, paras. 512-13. The Faulks Committee
also questioned whether jury trials should be granted as often as they were in defamation
cases. Id. paras. 455-57.
162. Id. para. 360.
163. See THE LAW AND THE PRESs, supra note 37, para. 113.
164. 570 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 584, 590-94 (1996).
165. See Weaver & Bennett, supra note 34, at 8.
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poor-for example, the vast majority of crime stories, or the lurid coverage
of the 1989 Hillsborough stadium disaster in which 95 soccer fans were
crushed to death-is influenced inevitably by the knowledge that defama-
tion actions are rarely brought by those who cannot afford the high stakes
game of libel litigation. On the other hand, the stories that are of the
greatest significance to a democratic society often go unreported, or are
disguised with euphemisms that mask their import.
The central political roles of the press are to provide the citizenry with
the information and debate necessary to the proper functioning of a
democracy, and to act as a sentinel, warning the people of abuses of power
by their governors. The English libel laws erect substantial obstacles
hindering the ability of the press to fulfil these responsibilities. When
Parliament gave its first serious consideration in nearly a half-century to
reforming the law of defamation, it failed to meaningfully address, much
less remove, these obstacles. In this sense, the Defamation Act 1996 must
be judged a failure. In an age of global communication, the consequences
of this failure will be felt far beyond the shores of the United Kingdom.

